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This paper examines the impact of promotion-based tournament incentives on cor-
porate acquisition performance. Measuring tournament incentives as the compensa-
tion ratio between the CEO and other senior executives, we show that acquirers with
greater tournament incentives experience lower announcement returns. Further anal-
ysis shows that the negative effect is driven by the risk-seeking behavior of senior
executives induced by tournament incentives. Our results are robust to alternative
identification strategies. Our evidence highlights that senior executives, in addition to
the CEO, play an influential role in acquisition decisions. (JEL G30, G34, G41, J31,
J33, J62)
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Introduction
Corporate acquisitions are one of the largest forms of corporate invest-
ment. As such, one would expect managers to exert a lot of effort into
selecting acquisition targets that can create shareholder value.
Paradoxically, the literature has found that this is often not the case
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with corporate managers perpetually embroiled in the destruction of
shareholder wealth via poor acquisition decisions (Andrade, Mitchell,
and Stafford 2001; Moeller, Schlingermannn, and Stulz 2005;
Hackbarth and Morellec 2008). Some authors show that the decision
to make value destroying acquisitions could be due to the empire build-
ing motive of the chief executive officer (CEO) (Jensen 1986; Lang, Stulz,
and Walkling 1991; Masulis, Wang, and Xie 2007; Harford, Humphery-
Jenner, and Powell 2012), whereas others have pointed out that managers
who receive little equity-based compensation have little incentive to make
good acquisitions (Lewellen and Loderer 1985; Datta, Iskandar-Datta,
and Raman 2001). However, there is relatively scant evidence on how
incentives of senior executives other than the CEO can play an incremen-
tal role in affecting acquisition performance.
The prior literature shows that senior executives are heavily involved
in acquisition decisions. For example, in more than 80 interviews con-
ducted by Graebner (2009), they show that vice presidents in acquiring
firms are heavily involved in making acquisition decisions, whereas
Greene and Smith (2018) document that CEOs are likely to delegate their
authority to other senior executives in acquisition decisions. The prior
literature also show that senior executives of bidding companies tend to
receive pay increases after completing an acquisition. Specifically, Firth
(1991) finds that senior executives are likely to receive a pay increase
regardless of the performance of the acquisition, whereas Coakley and
Iliopoulou (2006) show that the pay increase is proportional to deal size.
Yet, to the best of our knowledge, prior literature has not directly ex-
amined how incentives of senior executives other than that for the CEO
can directly affect acquisition performance, and thereby affecting share-
holder wealth. This is surprising, because senior executives are heavily
involved in acquisition decisions. In this paper, we aim to fill this gap in
the literature by examining the effect of tournament incentives of senior
executives (created by an observable pay differential between the CEO
and other senior executives, whom we refer to collectively as Vice-
Presidents (VPs) hereafter) on corporate acquisition performance.
Over the past decade, CEO pay has received much attention from the
media. Due to the skewed corporate pay structure, the advancement of
senior executives in a corporate hierarchy is often viewed as a tourna-
ment in which individuals compete with one another for the CEO posi-
tion. The compensation gap between workers of various ranks as a
feature of tournament incentives was first proposed by Lazear and
Rosen (1981). They argue that the large compensation packages received
by executives are likely to induce all lower-ranked employees in the firm
to compete and work harder to increase their chances of securing a pro-
motion. In the same vein, Bognanno (2001) focuses on CEO promotion
tournaments and uses the compensation gap between the CEO and other
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senior executives as the measure of tournament incentives. Since virtually
every major corporate decision requires the combined efforts of the se-
nior executive team, studies have found that tournament incentives are
associated with improved innovative efficiency (Jia, Tian, and Zhang
2017; Shen and Zhang 2018) and better firm performance (Kale, Reis,
and Venkateswaran 2009; Chen, Ezzamel, and Cai 2011; Burns, Minnick,
and Starks 2017; Hjertstrand and Swfford 2019).
Due to these findings, our primary hypothesis which we label the
“effort inducement hypothesis,” predicts that firms with greater tourna-
ment incentives should make better acquisitions as the senior executives
(VPs) in these firms would put more effort into assisting the CEO to
identify which acquisitions would benefit the company the most in order
to try and win the tournament prize (the pay gap). Anecdotal evidence
suggests that the senior executive team put a lot effort in acquisition
decisions. For example, in an interview with Google’s corporate devel-
opment VP Don Harrison, Harrison said, “my team, the deal sponsors,
and Google’s senior executives sit around the room to really decide
whether or not this (the acquisition) is something we should do”
(D’Onfro 2015).
On the other hand, several studies have shown that higher tournament
incentives also encourage greater risk-taking by senior executives. Goel
and Thakor (2008) theoretically model the relation between tournament
incentives and corporate risk-taking. In their model, they document that
if every senior executive chooses the same level of risk as his competitors
in the CEO promotion tournament, they will all have the same output at
the end of the period given the risk-return relationship. The probability
of getting promoted for all of the senior executives would then also be the
same. Therefore, each executive can increase his own probability of pro-
motion by taking on or supporting the CEO and board members in
pursuing riskier and larger projects as these projects can yield more ex-
treme outcomes. Hvide (2002) and Glilpatric (2009) show that such risk-
taking is often pursued at the expense of efficiency as they demonstrate
that the option-like payoff structure of promotion tournaments generate
perverse incentives for executives to engage in “excessive” risk-taking
(invest in more highly risky projects that have a lower mean output),
while Haß, Müller, and Vergauwe (2015) show that greater tournament
incentives lead to a higher likelihood of corporate fraud due to execu-
tives’ excessive risk-taking behavior.
Based on these established findings on the effect of tournament incen-
tives on managers’ risk-seeking behavior, we expect that corporate senior
executives would rationally support the CEO and board members in
making more acquisitions. In particular, the VPs are likely to advocate
and support those extremely large and risky acquisitions when they are
given the task of evaluating potential acquisition targets, because these
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deals can yield more extreme outcomes which increase their own chances
of winning the promotion tournament. The failure to support these deals
may push an executive down the rank in the tournament if one of these
acquisitions eventually achieves a big success for the company. More
importantly, senior executives are unlikely to receive any severe punish-
ment if the acquisition fails as the CEO has the final say on acquisitions
and is likely to be held publicly accountable, especially for these large
acquisitions where the CEO is likely to face extreme pressure from the
media once the acquisition fails (Lehn and Zhao 2006; Fee et al. 2018).
Moreover, objecting to these large and risky deals would unlikely benefit
senior executives even if these deals fail as they are typically aligned with
the longer-term strategic plans set for the company and backed by the
board of directors, and the board ultimately decides who the next CEO
would be. Hence, our alternative risk-seeking hypothesis predicts that
firms with greater tournament incentives are more likely to make more
overly risky acquisitions as the senior executives in these firms are in
theory more motivated to support the pursuit of extremely large and
risky acquisitions to increase their own chances of securing a promotion.
We test these two competing hypotheses by empirically examining the
relation between tournament incentives and acquisition performance us-
ing an extensive sample of 8,911 corporate acquisitions from 1994 to
2015. Controlling for performance-based incentives and risk-taking
incentives of the CEO, firm, and deal characteristics, together with
year and industry fixed effects, our baseline results indicate that tourna-
ment incentives created by pay gaps between the CEO and VPs are neg-
atively related to the firm’s acquisition performance as measured by
cumulative abnormal stock returns around the acquisition
announcement.
While our baseline results are more supportive of our risk-seeking
hypothesis, a potential concern is that unobservable firm heterogeneity
correlated with both a firm’s pay gap and acquisition performance may
be driving the results (i.e., the omitted variable concern), which makes it
difficult to establish causality.
We address the endogeneity concern with two alternative approaches,
although we are aware that they can only alleviate, but not completely
solve, the endogeneity problem due to the lack of direct exogenous
shocks in the executive compensation literature (Adams, Hermalin, and
Weisbach 2010; Coles, Lemmon, and Meschke 2012; Edmans, Gabaix,
and Jenter 2017). First, we employ an instrumental variable approach
where we instrument tournament incentives with the number of VPs and
size-adjusted industry average tournament incentives, as prior studies
suggest that the tournament prize increases with the number of VPs
and the level and structure of managerial compensation varies by firm
size and industry. The negative relationship between tournament
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incentives and acquisition performance remains robust to the use of these
instruments. Second, we follow Shen and Zhang (2018) and perform
regression analysis based on a propensity-score matched sample to con-
trol for the systematic differences in firm and deal characteristics between
firms with high and low tournament incentives. We find that our results
are also robust to this matching procedure.
We rule out that our findings may be driven by an entrenchment hy-
pothesis. This competing hypothesis arises as the pay gap between the
CEO and other senior executives also can be interpreted as CEO en-
trenchment (Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer 2011; Chen, Huang, and
Wei 2013), and the prior literature has found that entrenched CEOs
make worse acquisitions (Masulis, Wang, and Xie 2007; Harford,
Humphery-Jenner, and Powell 2012). To distinguish our tournament hy-
pothesis from the entrenchment hypothesis, we first explicitly control for
CEO entrenchment in all of our regressions. Second, we adopt a two-
stage regression approach, where in the first stage we decompose the pay
gap measure into the part that proxies for CEO entrenchment and the
residual part which more likely proxies for tournament incentives and in
the second stage we use the residual as our proxy for tournament incen-
tives. We continue to find a negative relationship between tournament
incentives and acquisition performance.
We then examine the source of the value destruction. According to our
risk-seeking hypothesis, we expect the adverse effect of tournament
incentives to be driven by the excessive risk-taking behavior of senior
executives induced by tournament incentives. Our empirical evidence
indicates three striking results. First, we find that firms with stronger
tournament incentives are more likely to conduct corporate acquisitions,
and the additional acquisitions are more likely to be value destroying.
Second, we discover that the adverse effects of tournament incentives on
acquisition performance are stronger for extremely large and highly risky
deals, as these deals are more likely to be conducted due to VPs’ risk-
seeking behavior. Third, we show that the negative effect of tournament
incentives is strongest in firms which the senior executives are more likely
to participate in the tournament, such as in firms that are more likely to
hire the next CEO from internal ranks and in firms where certain VPs are
significantly behind in the tournament and have the incentives to maxi-
mize corporate risk-taking to catch up to the tournament leaders.
To check the robustness of our results, we use alternative constructs to
proxy for tournament incentives, include other forms of senior execu-
tives’ incentives as additional controls in our regressions, and exclude
firms with no senior executives other than the CEO on the board. We
find that our results continue to hold in each of these robustness checks.
Our paper contributes to two separate strands of literature. First, it
contributes new evidence to the extensive literature on agency problems
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in corporate acquisitions. Prior studies have generally found that manag-
ers in firms with weaker corporate governance (Masulis, Wang, and Xie
2007; Harford, Humphery-Jenner, and Powell 2012) and those having
excessive cash flows (Jensen 1986; Harford 1999) are more likely to
make value destroying acquisitions. In contrast, firms that provide man-
agers with a higher level of equity-based compensation (Lewellen, Loderer,
and Rosenfeld 1985; Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman 2001) are more
likely to make value enhancing acquisitions. However, to the best of our
knowledge, no study has examined how the difference in compensation
levels between the CEO and other senior executives can lead to agency
problems that affect acquisition performance. This is an important re-
search question because almost every corporate acquisition decision
requires the combined efforts and agreements of its senior executive
team for a successful execution. Our study contributes to the literature
by showing that tournament incentives induce senior executives to support
overly risky acquisitions that on average destroy shareholder value.
Second, our paper contributes to the growing literature examining the
effects of tournament incentives. On the bright side, existing studies find
that greater tournament incentives lead to improved innovative efficiency
(Jia, Tian, and Zhang 2017; Shen and Zhang 2018) and better firm per-
formance (Kale, Reis, and Venkateswaran 2009; Chen, Ezzamel, and Cai
2011; Burns, Minnick, and Starks 2017). On the dark side, prior research
finds that greater tournament incentives can lead to excessive risk-taking
(Goel and Thakor 2008) and a higher likelihood of corporate fraud (Haß,
Müller, and Vergauwe 2015). By using a large sample of corporate
acquisitions, we are able to contribute new evidence on the effects of
tournament incentives on corporate acquisition performance and provide
an additional perspective in this debate.
1. Data Sources and Variable Construction
1.1 Data sources
We obtain compensation data for CEO and other senior executives from
the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) ExecuComp database. Following Kale,
Reis, and Venkateswaran (2009), we classify an executive as a CEO if he
is identified as the CEO of a firm in ExecuComp (CEOANN ¼ CEO),
and classify all other senior executives as VPs. We also collect numerous
CEO related variables from ExecuComp, such as the tenure of the CEO,
whether the CEO is also the Chair of the firm, whether the CEO was
promoted from within the firm, and the number and value of options
held by the CEO. We then obtain board information from RiskMetrics,
financial data from Compustat and financial markets data from CRSP
for our sample of firms in the ExecuComp database.
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To examine the effect of tournament incentives on acquisition perfor-
mance, we collect acquisitions data from the Securities Data Company
(SDC) M&A database from 1994 to 2015. We require a minimum deal
value of $1 million and we include only deals where the acquiring firm
controls less than 50% of the target’s stocks before the announcement
and owns 100% of the target’s stocks after the transaction. After merging
across databases, we end up with a final sample of 8,911 acquisitions made
by 1,934 acquirers during 1994 to 2015. Table 1 shows that the number of
firms and the number of acquisitions are fairly stable across time.
1.2 Tournament incentives
We use two measures to capture a firm’s tournament incentives.
Following Burns, Minnick, and Starks (2017), we use the ratio between
CEO’s total compensation package and the mean VP’s total compensa-
tion package as our main measure of tournament incentive. As a robust-
ness check, we also follow Kini and Williams (2012) and use the pay gap
between the CEO and the median VP as our alternative measure of
tournament incentives.1
Table 1
Number of acquiring firms and acquisitions by year























This table reports the number of firms that made acquisitions and the number of firms that they acquired
in each year during our entire sample period.
1 Following Kini and Williams (2012), we removed 367 observations for which the median VP’s pay is
higher than the CEO’s, as the authors find that in nearly all of these firms the CEO was also the founder
of the company and received little or no compensation. For these observations, the calculated tourna-
ment incentive measures are likely to be a noisy proxy of firm’s tournament incentives.
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1.3 Executive, firm, and deal characteristics
We control for CEO alignment and CEO risk taking incentives as they
have been shown to affect corporate investment decisions (Bizjak,
Brickley, and Coles 1993; Armstrong and Vashishtha 2012; Kumar and
Langberg 2014). Guided by the prior work of Kini and Williams (2012),
we include as control variables ln(CEO delta) and ln(CEO vega). CEO
delta is computed as the dollar increase in a CEO’s portfolio wealth for a
1% increase in the firm’s stock price, whereas CEO vega is computed as
the dollar increase in a CEO’s portfolio wealth for a 1% increase in the
standard deviation of the firm’s stock volatility.2 We also include CEO
entrenchment as a control variable, because prior studies document that
entrenched CEOs make worse acquisitions (Masulis, Wang, and Xie
2007; Harford, Humphery-Jenner, and Powell 2012). Specifically, we
combine multiple CEO entrenchment measures into a broader index of
governance quality. The measures we use include the entrenchment index
(Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 2009) CEO/Chair duality (Jensen 1993),
whether the CEO is the only insider director (Adams, Almeida, and
Ferreira 2005), whether the CEO is highly tenured (Berger, Ofek, and
Yermack 1997), and CEO hubris (Roll 1986). To construct the index, we
split each of the CEO entrenchment measures into two groups, with
higher values indicating higher entrenchment, and cumulate the ranks
(0–1). We then divide the cumulated ranks by the number of measures
available for the firm-year to obtain the CEO entrenchment index score.3
In addition, we also control for CEO turnover, number of VPs and VP
acquisition experience.
Following the acquisition literature, we control for a vector of firm and
deal characteristics that may affect a firm’s acquisition decisions (variable
definitions are provided in the appendix). Our firm-level controls include
firm size, leverage, Tobin’s q, cash flow, governance quality, and stock
price runup. Our deal-level controls include relative deal size, method of
payment, target public status, cross-industry indicator, cross-border in-
dicator and M&A wave. Following Jenter and Lewellen (2015), we com-
bine multiple governance measures into a broader index of governance
quality. The measures we use include board independence, board size and
institutional ownership (Aggarwal et al. 2011; Guo and Masulis 2015).
Similar to constructing the CEO entrenchment index, we split each of the
governance measures into two groups, with higher values indicating
2 We thank Lalitha Naveen for making the data on CEO delta and CEO vega publicly available. See
Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) for the detailed steps involved in the calculations.
3 Combining different measures into a single CEO entrenchment index helps us to control for multiple
aspects of CEO entrenchment without sacrificing sample size, because entrenchment index is only avail-
able until 2006, and board information is only available from 1996. We also separately examine each of
these measures (with the exception of the entrenchment index, as the data are only available until 2006)
in Section 3.2.
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better governance, and cumulate the ranks (0–1). We then divide the
cumulated ranks by the number of measures available for the firm-year
to obtain the governance index score.4
1.4 Summary statistics
Table 2 shows the summary statistics. We winsorize all continuous var-
iables at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Tournament incentives and execu-
tives and firm characteristics are all measured at the fiscal year-end prior
to the acquisition announcement. Panel A reports that on average the
CEO earns 3.03 times more than the average VP in the firm and has been
the CEO of the firm for 7 years. Among the CEOs, 69% of them were
promoted internally and 28% of them sit on the board as the only insider
director. Panel B shows that an average acquirer in our sample has a
leverage ratio of 18% and Tobin’s q of 2.17, which is consistent with the
figures reported in prior studies (e.g., Yim 2013; Huang et al. 2014).
Panel C shows that the average 5-day cumulative abnormal (announce-
ment) return for our sample of acquisitions is 0.41% and the size of the
average acquisition is 12% of acquirer’s market capitalization. Among
the acquisitions, 43% are cross-industry deals, 21% are cross-border
deals, and 40% are funded entirely by cash.
2. Tournament Incentives and Acquirer Announcement Returns
2.1 Baseline results
To investigate the relation between tournament incentives and acquisi-
tion performance, we first examine univariate comparisons of acquisition
performance for firms with different levels of tournament incentives. For
each year, we split all acquirers in that year into three groups based on
their level of tournament incentives. The low-tournament-incentive
group consists of the bottom third of all firms, the medium-
tournament-incentive group consists of the middle third of the firms,
and the high-tournament-incentive group consists of the top third of
the firms. We then conduct a univariate analysis to examine the relation
between tournament incentives and acquisition performance. Table 3
reports the results. The mean (median) announcement return of the
low-tournament-incentive group is 0.59% (0.39%), while the mean (me-
dian) announcement return of the high-tournament-incentive group is
significantly lower at 0.25% (0.12%). These results indicate that a firm’s
4 Similar to our handling of the CEO entrenchment index, combining different measures into a single
governance index helps us to control for multiple aspects of firm governance without sacrificing sample
size. To be consistent with our CEO entrenchment index, we divide the governance measure at the
median rather than at the tercile, as in Jenter and Lewellen (2015). All our results are similar if we
divide the governance measure at the tercile rather than at the median.
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Table 2
Summary statistics
N Mean SD Q1 Median Q3
A. Compensation and executive characteristics
Pay ratio 8,911 3.03 1.80 1.97 2.64 3.49
CEO delta 8,911 1.00 2.40 0.12 0.31 0.80
CEO vega 8,911 0.18 0.32 0.02 0.07 0.19
CEO tenure 8,650 7.02 7.21 2.00 5.00 10.00
CEO-chair 8,911 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00
CEO is only insider director 6,525 0.28 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00
Insider CEO 4,555 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 1.00
CEO turnover 8,911 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00
Number of VPs 8,911 4.94 1.15 4.00 5.00 6.00
VP acquisition experience 8,911 2.67 1.95 0.00 3.00 4.00
VP delta 8,863 0.19 0.38 0.03 0.07 0.18
VP vega 8,906 0.05 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.05
B. Firm characteristics
Firm size ($billions) 8,911 6.68 14.68 0.53 1.47 4.82
Leverage 8,911 0.18 0.17 0.04 0.13 0.26
Tobin’s q 8,911 2.17 1.45 1.30 1.73 2.45
Cash flow 8,911 0.14 0.08 0.09 0.14 0.19
Independent directors 6,525 0.71 0.17 0.61 0.75 0.85
Board size 6,525 9.68 2.84 8.00 9.00 11.00
Institutional investors 8,862 0.71 0.20 0.60 0.74 0.86
Entrenchment index 4,711 2.16 1.29 1.00 2.00 3.00
Stock price runup 8,911 0.02 0.41 0.25 0.02 0.20
C. Deal characteristics
CAR (%) 8,911 0.41 6.05 2.44 0.24 3.26
Relative deal size 8,911 0.12 0.22 0.01 0.04 0.12
Cross-industry 8,911 0.43 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00
Cross-border 8,911 0.21 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00
All-cash deal 8,911 0.40 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00
Private target 8,911 0.43 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
Subsidiary target 8,911 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00
M&A wave (000s) 8,911 0.23 0.26 0.08 0.15 0.27
This table reports the summary statistics for variables constructed based on the sample of U.S. public
firms from 1994 to 2015. Panel A reports the summary statistics for compensation variables and exec-
utive characteristics. Panel B reports the summary statistics for firm characteristics. Panel C reports the
summary statistics for deal characteristics. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentile levels. Table A1 in the appendix defines all variables.
Table 3
Univariate acquirer announcement return analysis
CAR (2, þ2)




Difference (high - low) 0.34** 0.26**
p-value .03 .02
This table reports and compares the mean and median acquirer announcement returns for different
tournament incentive groups. The low tournament incentive group has the bottom tercile of the obser-
vations, and the high tournament incentive group has the top tercile of the observations. A t-test and a
signed-rank test are performed on the differences in acquirer announcement returns between the high
tournament incentive group and the low tournament incentive group. *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
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tournament incentives is negatively associated with acquisition perfor-
mance, which is consistent with our risk-seeking hypothesis.
Next, we examine the relation between tournament incentives and ac-
quisition performance using a multivariate model. Specifically, we esti-
mate the following model:
CARi;t ¼ aþ bLnPayRatioi;t1 þ cZi;t1 þ YearFEþ IndustryFEþ ei;t;
(1)
where t denotes year, i denotes firm, and j denotes industries. The de-
pendent variable, CARi;t, is the 5-day cumulative abnormal returns
around the acquisition announcement date. Following Masulis, Wang,
and Xie (2007), the abnormal stock returns are calculated by estimating
the market model for each acquirer over a 200 day period ending 11 days
before the announcement date (-210, -11) with the CRSP value-weighted
return as the market index. The tournament incentives measure,
lnðPayRatioi;t1Þ, is calculated as the natural logarithm of the ratio be-
tween CEO’s total compensation package and the mean VP’s total com-
pensation package in the year before the acquisition. Zi;t1 is a vector of
firm, CEO, and deal characteristics that are likely to affect a firm’s ac-
quisition performance. YearFE and IndustryFE capture time and indus-
try fixed effects respectively. Because of the large presence of serial
acquirers in our sample, the residuals in our regressions may be corre-
lated and hence may overstate the t-statistics (Petersen 2009). For exam-
ple, serial correlation, which we cannot fully control for, could be present
in the investment behavior of serial acquirers. To address this potential
problem, we cluster standard errors by acquiring firm in all of our
regressions.5
We start with a parsimonious model that regresses abnormal returns
on the key variable of interest, ln(Pay ratio). Column 1 of Table 4
reports the results. We find that the coefficient estimate of ln(Pay ratio)
is negative and significant at the 1% level, suggesting a negative raw
association between tournament incentives and acquisition performance.
Next, we add executive-level and firm-level controls and report the results
in Column 2. The coefficient estimate continues to be negative and is
significant at the 5% level. Finally, we add deal-level controls into the
regression and find that the coefficient estimate of ln(Pay ratio) remains
negative and significant at the 5% level, as reported in Column 3. In
terms of economic importance, we find that a 1-standard-deviation in-
crease in the pay ratio centered on its sample mean reduces CAR by 22
5 We fully acknowledge that serial correlation in investment behavior may also exist among firms in the
same industry. In Table A3 in the appendix, we rerun the baseline regressions using standard errors
clustered by industry and industry-year. We continue to find a negative relation between tournament
incentives and acquisition performance, but the statistical significance drops to the 10% level when
clustering by industry-year.







/rcfs/article-abstract/9/2/384/5781970 by guest on 21 July 2020
Table 4
Effect of tournament incentives on acquisition performance
(1) (2) (3)
CAR (2, þ2)
ln(Pay ratio) 0.419*** 0.370** 0.354**
(2.919) (2.487) (2.376)
ln(CEO delta) 0.143** 0.144**
(2.068) (2.095)
ln(CEO vega) 0.104* 0.101*
(1.905) (1.853)
CEO entrenchment 0.247 0.177
(0.832) (0.599)
CEO turnover 0.430* 0.476**
(1.848) (2.045)
Number of VPs 0.074 0.069
(1.056) (0.995)
VP acquisition experience 0.041 0.044
(1.111) (1.187)




Tobin’s q 0.209** 0.184**
(2.476) (2.193)
Cash flow 2.232* 1.873
(1.788) (1.511)
Firm governance 0.028 0.054
(0.124) (0.244)
Stock price runup 1.157*** 1.132***
(5.467) (5.385)














Constant 2.700*** 3.926*** 2.045**
(4.637) (3.808) (2.010)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 8,911 8,911 8,911
R2 .02 .03 .04
This table reports the effect of tournament incentives on acquisition performance. We estimate the
following baseline model specification:
CARi;t ¼ aþ bLnPayRatioi;t1 þ cZi;t1 þYearFEþ IndustryFEþ ei;t:
Table A1 in the appendix defines all variables. t-statistics are calculated from robust standard errors
clustered by firm and are displayed in parentheses. *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.







/rcfs/article-abstract/9/2/384/5781970 by guest on 21 July 2020
basis points, which translates into a loss of $28.6 million in shareholder
value for the average acquirer in our sample.6
The coefficients of our control variables exhibit the expected signs. For
example, CEOs who receive more equity-based compensation have more
incentives to make value-enhancing acquisitions (Datta, Iskandar-Datta,
and Raman 2001); managers in larger firms are more entrenched (large
firm size serves as an effective takeover defense) and therefore are likely
to make value-destroying acquisitions (Masulis, Xie, and Wang 2007);
firms that are overvalued (higher Tobin’s q) are likely to reveal their true
value to the market on the announcement of an acquisition (Moeller,
Schlingemann, and Stulz 2004); acquirers do worse when paying with
equity due to the well-documented adverse selection problem (Myers
and Maliuf 1984); and acquirers do better when acquiring private and
subsidiary targets, because they capture a liquidity discount (Fuller,
Netter, and Stegemoller 2002).
2.2 Tournament incentives or CEO entrenchment?
In this paper we use the pay ratio between the CEO and VPs as a measure
of tournament incentives. However, prior studies (Bebchuk, Cremers,
and Peyer 2011; Chen et al. 2013) have also interpreted the pay ratio
as a measure of CEO power. Given that prior research finds that
entrenched CEOs tend to make worse acquisitions (Masulis, Wang,
and Xie 2007; Harford, Humphery-Jenner, and Powell 2012), it is also
possible that our findings are actually driven by the entrenchment hy-
pothesis rather than our tournament hypothesis. In addition to explicitly
controlling for CEO entrenchment in all of our regressions, in this section
we adopt a two-stage regression approach to further distinguish our
tournament hypothesis from the CEO entrenchment hypothesis.
Specifically, in the first stage we decompose the pay ratio measure into
2 parts, one part that proxies for CEO entrenchment and the residual
part that more likely proxies for tournament incentives. Then, in the
second stage, we use the residual part as our proxy for tournament
incentives to examine the relationship between tournament incentives
and acquisition performance.
Table 5 presents the results. Column 1 reports the results from the first-
stage regression. We see that the pay ratio is larger if the CEO is the only
insider on the board. Columns 2 to 4 report the results from the second-
stage regressions, where we regress announcement returns on the resid-
uals from our first-stage regression, which more likely proxy for
6 The economic significance is easier to interpret when it is computed in terms of a 1-standard-deviation
change in pay ratio rather than the natural logarithm of pay ratio. To achieve this, we first calculate the
level of pay ratio that is 0.5 standard deviations below its mean (low pay ratio) and 0.5 standard
deviations above its mean (high pay ratio). We then compute the difference between the natural loga-
rithm of high pay ratio and the natural logarithm of low pay ratio.
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Table 5
Effect of tournament incentives on acquisition performance: CEO entrenchment hypothesis versus tour-
nament hypothesis
First stage Second stage
Dep. ¼ CAR ln(Pay ratio) CAR
Residuals 0.422** 0.414** 0.421**
(2.380) (2.325) (2.368)
CEO Chair 0.027 0.119 0.133
(1.141) (0.650) (0.720)
CEO is the only insider director 0.135*** 0.269 0.251
(5.646) (1.251) (1.170)
CEO is highly tenured 0.026 0.148 0.136
(0.948) (0.729) (0.677)
CEO hubris 0.028 0.086 0.103
(1.170) (0.405) (0.481)
ln(CEO delta) 0.127 0.118
(1.391) (1.299)
ln(CEO vega) 0.009 0.006
(0.146) (0.092)
CEO turnover 0.012 0.049
(0.046) (0.181)
Number of VPs 0.059 0.064
(0.759) (0.828)
VP acquisition experience 0.058 0.058
(1.200) (1.221)




Tobin’s q 0.275*** 0.260***
(2.796) (2.654)
Cash flow 1.646 1.457
(1.148) (1.019)
Firm governance 0.464 0.504
(1.434) (1.564)
Stock price runup 1.456*** 1.449***
(5.619) (5.631)














Constant 0.949*** 1.197*** 2.632*** 1.160
(13.470) (2.771) (3.121) (1.322)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 5,685 5,685 5,685 5,685
R2 .07 .02 .04 .05
This table reports the effect of tournament incentives on acquisition performance after decomposing the
pay ratio measure into a part that proxies for CEO entrenchment and a part that proxies for tournament
incentives Column 1 reports the result of the first stage, where the pay ratio is regressed on measures of
CEO entrenchment. Columns 2 to 4 report results for the second stage, where abnormal returns are
regressed on the residuals from the first stage, the part of the pay ratio that proxies for tournament
incentives. Table A1 in the appendix defines all variables. t-statistics are calculated from robust standard
errors clustered by firm and are displayed in parentheses. *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
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tournament incentives. We find results that are similar to our baseline
regressions, indicating that the negative relation between pay gaps and
acquisition performance is indeed driven by tournament incentives rather
than CEO entrenchment.
2.3 Acquisition propensity and deal risk
Our evidence so far suggests that tournament incentives harm acquisition
performance, and our risk-seeking hypothesis predicts that this effect is
likely to be driven by high tournament incentive firms making more
overly risky acquisitions. In this section, we first examine whether firms
with higher tournament incentives are more likely to conduct acquisi-
tions, and then we test whether the value destruction caused by tourna-
ment incentives are concentrated in overly risky deals.
We first run a logit model to examine the effect of tournament incen-
tives on acquisition propensity. Column 1 of Table 6 shows the results.
Indeed, we find that firms with higher tournament incentives are more
likely to conduct acquisitions. Following Minnick, Unal, and Yang
(2011) we then split acquisitions into those that are value enhancing
and those that are value destroying based on their cumulative announce-
ment returns and run a multinominal logit model. The dependent vari-
able equals to one if a firm makes an acquisition and the announcement
return is negative (CAR < 0), and two if a firm makes an acquisition and
the announcement return is positive (CAR > 0). The dependent variable
equals to zero for the benchmark nonacquirer sample. The results in
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 6 show that firms with higher tournament
incentives are more likely to conduct value-destroying acquisitions.
We then test whether the value destruction caused by tournament incen-
tives are concentrated in extremely large and extremely risky deals, as these
deals are likely to be the overly risky deals supported by the VPs due to
their tournament incentives. First, we measure deal size using relative deal
size (deal value divided by acquirer’s market capitalization), and define
deals in the 4th quartile in each year to be extremely large deals.
Consistent with our prediction, Columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 show that
the negative effect of tournament incentives is stronger for extremely large
deals. Second, we follow Agrawal andMandelker (1987) and use the change
in the standard deviation of acquirers’ stock returns surrounding the acqui-
sition to proxy for deal risk. Specifically, deal risk is calculated as the dif-
ference in the acquirers’ standard deviation of stock returns in the post-
acquisition period (11 to 70 days following the effective date) compared to
the preacquisition period (120 days to 60 days prior to the announcement
date). The preacquisition period ends 60 days before the announcement
date and the post-acquisition period begins 11 days after the effective
date in order to avoid the acquisition negotiation or completion period in
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affecting stock returns. We again sort the acquisitions into quartiles accord-
ing to their level of risk and define deals in the 4th quartile in each year to be
extremely risky deals. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 present the results.
Consistent with our predictions, we find that the negative effect of tourna-
ment incentives is strongest in extremely risky deals.7
2.4 VP incentives
The effectiveness of tournament incentives also depends on VPs’ eager-
ness to compete in the promotion tournament, as holding a promotion
Table 6
Effect of tournament incentives on decisions to acquire
(1) (2) (3)
Pr(Acquisition) Pr(CAR<0) Pr(CAR>0)
ln(Pay ratio) 0.081** 0.121*** 0.044
(2.380) (2.717) (1.090)
ln(CEO delta) 0.047*** 0.027 0.065***
(2.870) (1.260) (3.265)
ln(CEO vega) 0.001 0.006 0.005
(0.134) (0.565) (0.473)
CEO entrenchment 0.094 0.038 0.144
(1.011) (0.325) (1.271)
CEO turnover 0.143*** 0.107 0.177**
(2.588) (1.535) (2.460)
Number of VPs 0.117*** 0.099*** 0.134***
(7.790) (5.079) (6.900)
VP acquisition experience 0.331*** 0.317*** 0.344***
(34.008) (26.923) (28.836)
ln(Firm size) 0.112*** 0.168*** 0.056***
(6.628) (8.034) (2.689)
Leverage 0.943*** 0.942*** 0.951***
(7.017) (5.584) (6.123)
Tobin’s q 0.019 0.033** 0.003
(1.576) (2.442) (0.135)
Cash flow 0.724*** 0.518** 0.953***
(3.839) (2.165) (3.736)
Firm governance 0.392*** 0.418*** 0.371***
(7.372) (6.157) (5.687)
Constant 2.919*** 4.585*** 2.775***
(7.495) (7.015) (6.810)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 26,530 26,530
Pseudo-R2 .13 .10
This table reports the effect of tournament incentives on decisions to acquire. The dependent variable for
the logit model in Column 1 equals one if the firm makes at least one acquisition in the year, and zero
otherwise. The dependent variable for the multinomial logit model in Columns 2 and 3 equals one (two)
if the firm makes at least one acquisition in the year and the deal value weighted average announcement
returns is negative (positive), and zero if a firm makes no acquisition during the year. Table A1 in the
appendix defines all variables. t-statistics are calculated from robust standard errors clustered by firm
and are displayed in parentheses. *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
7 We repeat our analysis on deal size and deal risk using within-industry deals and show the results in
Table A4 in the appendix. These additional tests allow us to focus on acquisitions occurring within
respective industries.
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Table 7
Effect of tournament incentives on acquisition performance: Deal risk
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Deal size Deal risk
Q1 - Q3 Q4 Q1 - Q3 Q4
ln(Pay ratio) 0.102 1.325*** 0.148 0.975***
(0.673) (3.364) (0.871) (3.136)
H0: b(1)¼b(2) H0: b(3)¼b(4)
(0.003) (0.018)
ln(CEO delta) 0.073 0.342* 0.114 0.259*
(1.090) (1.819) (1.439) (1.771)
ln(CEO vega) 0.026 0.234 0.080 0.184
(0.506) (1.538) (1.339) (1.566)
CEO entrenchment 0.131 0.158 0.428 0.612
(0.436) (0.208) (1.275) (0.952)
CEO turnover 0.287 1.279** 0.535** 0.416
(1.184) (2.209) (2.012) (0.817)
Number of VPs 0.018 0.188 0.066 0.065
(0.256) (1.179) (0.838) (0.458)
VP experience 0.077** 0.028 0.046 0.042
(2.054) (0.304) (1.058) (0.575)
ln(Firm size) 0.089 0.322* 0.175** 0.083
(1.414) (1.877) (2.467) (0.632)
Leverage 0.115 2.105* 1.190* 0.191
(0.213) (1.771) (1.907) (0.178)
Tobin’s q 0.199*** 0.007 0.223** 0.089
(2.593) (0.026) (2.402) (0.517)
Cash flow 1.935 2.588 2.387* 0.566
(1.533) (0.878) (1.651) (0.248)
Firm governance 0.313 0.963* 0.070 0.154
(1.404) (1.832) (0.288) (0.327)
Stock price runup 0.834*** 1.757*** 1.269*** 0.770*
(3.850) (3.936) (5.294) (1.810)
Relative deal size 4.363* 0.002 0.499 0.233
(1.821) (0.003) (0.895) (0.210)
Cross-industry 0.046 0.593 0.026 0.453
(0.328) (1.474) (0.157) (1.561)
Cross-border 0.130 0.422 0.191 0.086
(0.770) (0.834) (1.077) (0.220)
All-cash deal 0.204 0.957** 0.504*** 0.440
(1.485) (2.562) (3.241) (1.546)
Private target 0.567*** 2.615*** 1.332*** 1.216**
(2.807) (5.326) (5.972) (2.497)
Subsidiary target 0.858*** 3.512*** 1.726*** 2.288***
(4.057) (7.659) (7.595) (4.460)
M&A wave 0.095 1.135 0.776 1.592
(0.109) (0.404) (0.769) (0.895)
Constant 0.141 13.882*** 2.222* 1.558
(0.077) (6.657) (1.946) (1.127)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 6,684 2,227 6,684 2,227
R2 .02 .13 .05 .06
This table reports the effect of tournament incentives on acquisition performance conditional upon deal
risk. Deal size is measured as the relative deal size. Deal risk is measured as the post-acquisition minus
preacquisition stock return standard deviations. Table A1 in the appendix defines all variables. t-statis-
tics are calculated from robust standard errors clustered by firm and are displayed in parentheses. *p <
.1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
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tournament would have no value at all if none of the VPs are going to
compete in the tournament. Hence, we expect the effect of tournament
incentives on acquisition performance to be stronger in firms where VPs
are more eager to compete in a promotion tournament.
First, VPs are more eager to compete in the promotion tournament if
they believe that the board is likely to hire the next CEO internally.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that firms’ decision to hire CEOs internally
tends to be sticky. For example, Hewlett-Packard was hiring its CEO
internally for the first 52 years of its operations (Larcker and Tayan
2011). Hence, we expect that VPs are more likely to take excessive risks
if the current CEO was hired internally, because VPs are more likely to
believe that the firm is going to continue with a similar senior recruitment
strategy and will also hire the next CEO internally. We define internally
hired CEOs as those who have been working for a firm prior to becoming
CEO. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 8 report the results. We find that the
negative effect of tournament incentives on acquisition performance only
occurs in firms in which the current CEO has been promoted from
within.
Second, theoretical models predict that only players who are signifi-
cantly behind in a tournament have the incentives to take excessive risks
to catch up to the tournament leaders, because players who are ranked
relatively close to each other only have to increase their performance by a
small margin to outperform the other player to claim the tournament
prize (Hvide 2002; Fang, Noe, and Strack 2019). Similarly, in a recent
empirical study that investigates succession tournaments in Korean fam-
ily firms, Lee, Shin, and Yun (2018) find that succession tournaments
result in excessive risk-taking. They find that the lagging sons would take
excessive risks in order to catch up to the leading son in succession
tournaments, and the leading son would mimic the lagging sons’ strategy
to preserve his lead, resultant overall in excessive corporate risk-taking.
Based on these past findings, we expect firms in which VPs’ pay are
highly dispersed are more likely to conduct excessive risky acquisitions,
because the lagging VPs would try to maximize corporate risk-taking to
catch up to the leading VP by supporting the CEO in making extremely
risky acquisitions. At the same time, the leading VP would try to main-
tain the lead by conducting the same action as the laggers, which results
in all of the VPs collectively advocating extremely risky acquisitions.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 8 report the results. We find that the negative
effect of tournament incentives on acquisition performance is stronger in
firms where VP pay is highly dispersed.
Third, VPs should be less eager to compete in a promotion tournament
in firms operating in industries with a high level of industry concentra-
tion and high degree of product similarity as the probability of an inter-
nal promotion is likely to be lower within these firms, because outsiders
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can also compete for the CEO’s job, and also it is easier for VPs to look
for outside opportunities in these industries. We source firm-level indus-
try concentration and product similarity proxies from Hoberg and
Phillips (2016) and report the subsample results in Columns 5 to 8 of
Table 8.8 Consistent with our predictions we find that the effect of tour-
nament incentives on acquisition performance is significantly weaker in
firms operating in industries with higher levels of industry concentration
and higher degrees of product similarity, as VPs working in these indus-
tries are conceivably less likely to compete aggressively in a promotion
tournament. The combination of VPs’ own enhanced outside promotion
opportunities within the industry (as their professional networks are
likely to be stronger and/or their expertise and skill sets are most highly
valued and transferable) and the greater external competition faced for
the internal promotion is likely to weaken tournament incentives within
these corporate environments.
3. Identification
A potential endogeneity issue that may affect our baseline results is the
omitted variables bias. Even after controlling for several known CEO,
firm, and deal characteristics and year and industry fixed effects, there
may still be unobservable firm or CEO heterogeneity correlated with
both the pay gap and acquisition performance, and these factors could
bias our results. As both tournament and CEO incentive measures are
related to managerial compensation, ln(Pay gap), ln(CEO delta), and
ln(CEO vega) could all be endogenous. In this section, we address the
endogeneity concern using two alternative approaches, although we are
conscious of the fact that they can only ease, but not completely solve,
the endogeneity problem due to the lack of natural experiments (direct
exogenous shocks) in the executive compensation literature (Adams,
Hermalin, and Weisbach 2010; Coles, Lemmon, and Meschke 2012;
Edmans, Gabaix, and Jenter 2017).
3.1 Instrumental variable analysis
First, we employ an instrumental variables (IV) approach to address the
potential endogeneity concern. Knyazeva, Knyazeva, and Masulis (2013)
show that the proximity to large pools of local director talent leads to
significantly more independent boards, indicating that executives tend to
stay and work in the same geographical area throughout their career.
Additionally, executives are most likely to switch between similar sized
firms in the same industry as Murphy (1999) documents that the level of
8 See Hoberg and Phillips (2016) for details on the construction of these proxies.
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managerial compensation varies by firm size and industry. Taking into
account these criteria, we instrument tournament incentives with “Local
supply of VPs.” Local supply of VPs is calculated as the sum of total
number of VPs working in firms headquartered in the same ZIP code
(obtained from 10-k filings), same size quartile and the same Fama-
French 49 industry as the acquirer in the year before the acquisition.
We expect the local supply of VPs to be positively correlated to the
pay ratio, as the excess supply of VPs are likely to increase the bargaining
power of corporations, thereby leading to a further increase in the pay
gap between the CEO and VPs. On the other hand, we do not expect the
level of the local supply of VPs to directly affect any particular firm’s
acquisition performance. In addition to using the local supply of VPs as
an instrument, we also follow Kale, Reis, and Venkateswaran (2009) and
Kini and Williams (2012) and use the average tournament incentives and
CEO incentives for firms in the same industry and in the same size quar-
tile as the acquirer to instrument for tournament incentives and CEO
incentives, respectively.
Table 9 presents the two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression results.
Columns 1 to 3 report the results from the first-stage regressions for the
three endogenous variables. We include the same set of controls as the
baseline regressions and year and industry fixed effects with standard
errors clustered by acquiring firm. Column 1 shows that the level of local
supply of VPs and size-adjusted industry average values of tournament
incentives are positively correlated with the firm’s tournament incentives,
and Columns 2 and 3 show that size-adjusted industry average values of
CEO incentives are positively correlated with the firm’s CEO incentives,
affirming the validity of these instruments used.
Column 4 reports the results from the second-stage regression. Our
main tournament variable ln(Pay ratio) and the two CEO incentive
variables ln(CEO delta) and ln(CEO vega) are all replaced by their fitted
values from the first-stage regressions. We find that the coefficient esti-
mate of ln(Pay ratio) is negative and statistically significant at the 5%
level, which supports our risk-seeking hypothesis. In addition to the re-
gression results, we also report the F-statistics for our first-stage regres-
sions and the Anderson-Rubin F-statistics for our second-stage
regression to show that the instruments are relevant and present the
statistics from the Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions to
show that our instruments are valid.9
9 The reported magnitude of the tournament effect is 11 times larger in the IV estimations compared with
the baseline results, which is a common problem in empirical studies as documented by Jiang (2017).
Hence, we focus our economic interpretation on the baseline estimates, as they provide a lower bound on
the likely effect of tournament incentives.
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Table 9
Effect of tournament incentives on acquisition performance: 2SLS results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First stage Second-stage







Local supply of VPs 0.618** 1.537** 1.396*
(2.293) (2.124) (1.782)
ln(Industry average pay ratio) 0.297*** 0.189 0.336
(3.515) (0.764) (1.339)
ln(Industry average CEO delta) 0.104*** 0.487*** 0.312***
(2.748) (5.717) (2.720)
ln(Industry average CEO vega) 0.060* 0.219*** 0.566***
(1.794) (3.276) (5.825)
CEO entrenchment 0.160*** 0.998*** 0.487*** 0.432
(4.321) (11.340) (4.537) (0.615)
CEO turnover 0.068*** 0.055 0.089 0.768***
(2.708) (1.124) (1.329) (2.721)
Number of VPs 0.013* 0.096*** 0.024 0.013
(1.785) (5.687) (1.092) (0.127)
VP experience 0.004 0.044*** 0.025** 0.060
(1.010) (3.569) (2.009) (1.205)
ln(Firm size) 0.000 0.358*** 0.446*** 0.017
(0.017) (10.399) (12.005) (0.042)
Leverage 0.003 0.631*** 0.717*** 0.761
(0.046) (3.590) (3.406) (0.900)
Tobin’s q 0.001 0.345*** 0.076*** 0.195
(0.092) (17.580) (2.832) (0.845)
Cash flow 0.039 0.742** 1.373*** 1.273
(0.293) (2.123) (3.681) (0.806)
Firm governance 0.110*** 0.185*** 0.392*** 0.511
(3.910) (2.686) (5.143) (1.245)
Stock price runup 0.031** 0.070** 0.020 1.230***
(2.011) (2.185) (0.510) (5.415)
Relative deal size 0.030 0.169*** 0.038 0.528
(1.076) (2.723) (0.459) (1.011)
Cross-industry 0.012 0.006 0.034 0.061
(0.907) (0.173) (0.879) (0.392)
Cross-border 0.007 0.019 0.011 0.093
(0.469) (0.598) (0.268) (0.517)
All-cash deal 0.006 0.008 0.076** 0.468***
(0.511) (0.290) (2.122) (3.185)
Private target 0.021 0.013 0.050 1.223***
(1.229) (0.318) (0.998) (5.601)
Subsidiary target 0.012 0.026 0.054 1.804***
(0.710) (0.614) (1.085) (8.092)
M&A wave 0.289*** 0.115 0.317 1.268
(2.639) (0.483) (0.993) (1.108)
Constant 0.186 0.043 0.409 3.640**
(1.126) (0.122) (0.747) (2.206)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-statistics 8.99*** 98.85*** 69.42***
Anderson-Rubin F-statistics 9.82**
Hansen J-statistics (p-value) 0.31 (.58)
No. of observations 8,911 8,911 8,911 8,911
This table reports the 2SLS regressions of tournament incentives on acquisition performance. Columns 1
to 3 report the result of the first stage, where tournament, alignment, and risk-taking incentives are
regressed on instrumental variables. Column 4 reports results for the second stage, where cumulative
abnormal returns are regressed over the instrumented tournament, alignment, and risk-taking incentives.
Table A1 in the appendix defines all variables. t-statistics are calculated from robust standard errors
clustered by firm and are displayed in parentheses. *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
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3.2 Propensity-score matching
Although the instrumental variables are widely used in the literature
(Kale, Reis, and Venkateswaran 2009; Kini and Williams 2012), one
concern is that when an industry specific shock occurs it can jointly affect
both M&A activities and compensation levels of CEOs and VPs within
an industry. That is, even though the industry median levels of manage-
rial compensation do not have a direct effect on a firm’s acquisition
performance, the occurrence of an industry shock may cause a correla-
tion between industry median levels of managerial compensation and a
firm’s acquisition performance and threaten the validity of our instru-
mental variable analysis (Gormley and Matsa 2014). Hence, in our sec-
ond approach to address the endogeneity problem, we follow the recent
work of Shen and Zhang (2018) and conduct regression analysis on a
propensity-score matched sample, in which firms with high tournament
incentives are matched with firms with low tournament incentives to
control for the systematic differences in firm and deal characteristics
across these two groups.
To construct the matched sample, we first estimate a probit regression
in which the dependent variable is High pay ratio. This is an indicator
variable that takes a value equal to one if the acquirer’s pay ratio is above
the median and zero if the acquirer’s pay ratio is below the median. The
independent variables in our probit regression includes all firm character-
istics that may determine firm-specific pay ratios. This regression gener-
ates a predicted probability of being a high-pay-ratio firm for each
observation, which is called the propensity score. Second, we match
each treatment firm (a firm with high pay ratio) with a matching control
firm (a firm with low pay ratio) drawn from the same year and Fama-
French 49 industry and has the closest propensity score within a caliper
of 1% (and 5% as a robustness check). Using the matched firm sample,
we conduct the baseline regressions using the new indicator variableHigh
pay ratio. Table 10 presents the regression results. The coefficients for
High pay ratio are negative and significant at the 5% level.
4. Robustness Tests
In this section, we discuss the results of an array of additional robustness
tests. These robustness tests relate to alternative constructs to proxy for
tournament incentives, the inclusion of VP equity incentives as additional
controls, individually controlling for different firm governance aspects,
and excluding firms with no VPs on the board from our sample.
First, tournament incentives may be dependent on the number of con-
testants in the tournament. To control for this potential bias, we conduct
our analysis using the natural logarithm of pay ratio divided by the
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Table 10
Effect of tournament incentives on acquisition performance: Matched sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Caliper ¼ 1% Caliper ¼ 5%
High pay ratio 0.579** 0.603** 0.580** 0.604**
(-2.134) (-2.259) (-2.203) (-2.334)
ln(CEO delta) 0.152 0.214 0.184 0.233*
(1.008) (1.432) (1.282) (1.649)
ln(CEO vega) 0.139 0.154 0.147 0.160
(-1.168) (-1.312) (-1.289) (-1.419)
CEO entrenchment 0.406 0.416 0.380 0.393
(0.681) (0.700) (0.663) (0.691)
CEO turnover 0.234 0.223 0.094 0.086
(-0.553) (-0.517) (-0.230) (-0.207)
Number of VPs 0.047 0.060 0.049 0.061
(-0.364) (-0.471) (-0.389) (-0.481)
VP experience 0.134 0.136* 0.130 0.132*
(1.624) (1.651) (1.636) (1.678)
ln(Firm size) 0.359*** 0.254* 0.387*** 0.288**
(-2.879) (-1.939) (-3.183) (-2.250)
Leverage 1.709* 0.967 1.755* 1.098
(1.664) (0.942) (1.746) (1.095)
Tobin’s q 0.031 0.017 0.033 0.011
(-0.223) (0.116) (-0.245) (0.079)
Cash flow 2.287 1.627 1.887 1.205
(1.009) (0.712) (0.849) (0.538)
Firm governance 0.027 0.096 0.065 0.174
(0.060) (-0.207) (-0.152) (-0.403)
Stock price runup 0.915** 0.875** 0.883** 0.858**
(-2.245) (-2.145) (-2.185) (-2.120)






All-cash deal 0.143 0.144
(0.546) (0.561)
Private target 1.460*** 1.394***
(3.561) (3.535)
Subsidiary target 2.042*** 1.988***
(4.869) (4.883)
M&A wave 1.560 1.131
(-0.866) (-0.672)
Constant 6.246*** 3.274 4.906*** 2.272
(3.039) (1.540) (2.849) (1.267)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 2,316 2,316 2,402 2,402
R2 .06 .07 .06 .07
This table reports the effect of tournament incentives on acquisition performance using a matched
sample. To construct this matched sample, we first estimate the following probit regression: the depen-
dent variable (High pay gap) equals one if a firm’s pay gap is above the median, and zero if a firm’s pay
gap is below the median; the independent variables are various firm characteristics. The predicted like-
lihood is the propensity score. We then match each treatment firm (a firm with high pay gap) with a
matching firm (a firm with low pay gap) drawn from the same year and industry and have the closest
propensity score within a caliper of 1% (and 5%). Table A1 in the appendix defines all variables. t-
statistics are calculated from robust standard errors clustered by firm and are displayed in parentheses.
*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
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number of VPs as a proxy for tournament incentives. Column 1 of
Table 11 reports the results. Our prior findings remain unchanged.
Second, we follow Kini and Williams (2012) and repeat our analysis
using the difference between the CEO’s pay and the median VP pay as
an alternative proxy for tournament incentives. Results in Column 2 of
Table 11 show that our results continue to hold. Third, rather than com-
bining governance variables into a single index and controlling for the
index, we now individually control for board independence, board size,
and institutional ownership (Masulis and Zhang 2018). The adverse ef-
fect of tournament incentives on firms’ acquisition performance contin-
ues to hold despite the significant reduction in sample size. Fourth, in all
of our tests so far, we have assumed that all VPs have the same likelihood
to be named the next CEO and the potential pay rise from becoming the
next CEO is the only incentive driving VPs. However, VPs with better
ability are more likely to become the next CEO, and hence this may
potentially bias our results. To explicitly account for the influence of
VP ability, we furthermore control for the standard deviation of VP
ability in our regressions. Following Fredaseyu, Linck, and Wagner
(2018), VP ability is calculated using the combination of VPs’ educa-
tional background and professional experience.10 Similarly, VPs may
have other incentives in addition to becoming the next CEO. For exam-
ple, Coakley and Iliopoulou (2006) show that VPs often receive pay
increases after completing an acquisition, and this may represent another
incentive for VPs to support an acquisition. VPs have alignment and risk-
taking incentives associated with the firm’s stock performance, and these
incentives also could be driving their decisions in choosing suitable ac-
quisition targets. VPs may also have better outside opportunities that
offer higher compensation, and this may affect their incentive to partic-
ipate in the tournament. We address these possibilities by controlling for
the average VP pay increases after the acquisition, average VP delta and
vega, the ratio between the fraction of equity compensation of the CEO
and the fraction of average equity compensation of VPs, and the ratio
between average VP pay within the firm and average VP pay for firms in
the same industry and same size quartile as the firm. Column 4 of
Table 11 reports the results with these additional controls added. We
continue to find a negative effect of tournament incentives on acquisition
performance. Fifth, we exclude firms with no VPs on the board, because
VPs in these firms are less likely to play a significant role in acquisitions.
10 Following Fredaseyu, Linck, and Wagner (2018), education background contains information on
whether a VP holds undergraduate, graduate, and/or MBA degrees. Professional experience contains
information on whether a VP has legal/consulting experience, academic experience, accounting/finance
experience, and/or management experience. VP ability score is calculated as the sum of these seven
variables. We were unable to obtain consistent information from BoardEx for our sample firms on the
other two variables used in Fredaseyu, Linck, and Wagner (2018), political and military experience, so
we do not include these dimensions in our VP ability score.
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We find that VPs sit on the boards of 71% of the firms. Column 5 of
Table 11 shows the results. After the exclusion of firms with no VPs on
the board, we find that a 1-standard-deviation increase in the pay ratio
centered on its sample mean reduces CAR by 30 basis points. While the
point estimate is higher than the estimate obtained using our full sample,
the difference is not statistically significant.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the effects of tournament incentives of senior
executives, created by an observable pay differential between the CEO
and other senior executives, on the performance of corporate acquisi-
tions. Using a large sample of corporate acquisitions made by U.S. firms
over the period from 1994 to 2015, we show that stronger tournament
incentives lead to worse acquisition performance. This relation holds in
Table 11
Effect of tournament incentives on acquisition performance: Robustness results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Exclude firms with no
VPs on the board
ln(Pay ratio) 0.455*** 0.447** 0.648***
(-2.749) (-2.160) (-2.688)




Board independence 0.030 1.097 0.570
(0.051) (1.540) (0.702)
Board size 0.007 0.028 0.038
(-0.190) (0.717) (0.907)
Institutional ownership 0.264 0.374 0.261
(-0.507) (-0.681) (-0.416)
ln(VP delta) 0.093 0.151
(-0.735) (-1.084)
ln(VP vega) 0.046 0.002
(-0.019) (-0.291)
ln(Equity pay ratio) 0.320 0.326
(1.357) (1.238)
ln(Industry VP pay ratio) 0.205 0.257
(-1.152) (-1.226)
VP pay rise after acquisition (%) 0.016 0.167
(0.084) (0.758)
SD(VP ability) 0.263 0.191
(-1.178) (-0.713)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 8,911 8,911 6,476 3,985 2,822
R2 .04 .04 .05 .06 .08
This table reports the summary of additional robustness test results for tournament incentives on ac-
quisition performance. Table A1 in the appendix defines all variables. t-statistics are calculated from
robust standard errors clustered by firm and are displayed in parentheses. *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
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an instrumental variable regression analysis and in propensity-score
matched sample regressions. Furthermore, our empirical evidence indi-
cates that the negative effect of tournament incentives is driven by the
risk-seeking behavior of senior executives.
We also address an alternative interpretation of our empirical findings.
Some authors have argued that the pay ratio between the CEO and other
senior executives also can be a measure of CEO entrenchment, and prior
literature has found that entrenched CEOs make worse acquisitions. We
explicitly control for CEO entrenchment in all of our regressions and also
adopt a two-stage regression approach to distinguish our tournament
hypothesis from the entrenchment hypothesis. We find that the negative
relationship between tournament incentives and acquisition performance
holds in the two-stage regression models, enabling us to rule out this
alternative interpretation of our results.
Our paper contributes to the extant literature on corporate acquisi-
tions by showing that senior executives play a crucial role in corporate
acquisition decisions in addition to the CEO. Specifically, we show that
tournament incentives induce senior executives to support overly risky
acquisitions that, on average, destroy shareholder value. This channel of
wealth destruction adds to our current knowledge on how acquiring
shareholders lost significant wealth in the hands of corporate managers
as documented by Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005). Overall, our
findings add to the debate on whether tournament incentives work to
influence managerial decision-making by uncovering an understudied
dark side of tournament incentives on corporate investment decisions
within firms. Specifically, we present new empirical evidence to uncover
that tournament incentives induces undesirable corporate acquisition
decisions and outcomes for shareholder wealth. Our results provide cor-
porate boards with another pivotal factor to consider when designing
compensation structures that can effectively lift firm performance. We
leave the investigation of how executive compensation and governance
mechanisms should be designed to mitigate the adverse consequences of
tournament incentives on corporate policies to future research.












Measures of CEO tournament
ln(Pay ratio) Natural logarithm of the ratio between CEO’s total compensation
(Execucomp: TDC1) and mean VP’s total compensation
ln(Pay gap) Natural logarithm of the difference between CEO’s total compensation
(Execucomp: TDC1) and median VP’s total compensation
Measures of acquisition risk and performance
CAR (2,þ2) Acquirer’s 5-day cumulative abnormal return calculated using the market
model. The market model parameters are estimated over the period (-
210, -11) with the CRSP value-weighted return as the market index
Deal risk Post-acquisition period (11 days to 70 days following the effective date)
minus preacquisition period (120 days to 60 days prior to the an-
nouncement date) stock-return standard deviation
Bidder CEO and VP characteristics
ln(CEO delta) Natural logarithm of dollar increase in acquirer CEO’s portfolio wealth
for a percentage increase in the underlying stock price
ln(CEO vega) Natural logarithm of dollar increase in acquirer CEO’s portfolio wealth
for a percentage increase in the standard deviation of the underlying
stock price
CEO-chair Dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO is also the Chair of the firm,
and zero otherwise
CEO is highly tenured Dummy variable that equals to one if CEO tenure falls in the fourth
quartile, and zero otherwise
CEO hubris Dummy variable that equals one if the Demerjian, Lev, and McVay
(2012) managerial ability index falls in the fourth quartile, and zero
otherwise
CEO entrenchment CEO entrenchment index consisting of CEO/chair duality, whether the
CEO is the only insider on the board, whether the CEO is highly ten-
ured, CEO hubris and the entrenchment index A higher value indicates
greater CEO entrenchment
CEO turnover Dummy variable that equals one for the year after a CEO turnover
event, and zero otherwise
Number of VPs Number of VPs reported in Execucomp
VP acquisition experience Number of VPs within the firm who have worked in a firm that con-
ducted an acquisition in the past 3 years
ln(VP delta) Natural logarithm of one plus the dollar increase in the average VP’s
portfolio wealth for a percentage increase in the underlying stock price
ln(VP vega) Natural logarithm of one plus the dollar increase in the average VP’s
portfolio wealth for a percentage increase in the standard deviation of
the underlying stock price
ln(Equity pay ratio) Natural logarithm of the ratio between the fraction of equity compen-
sation of the CEO and the average fraction of equity compensation of
VPs. Equity compensation is calculated as the sum of the value of stock
grants and option grants
ln(Industry VP pay ratio) Natural logarithm of the ratio between average VP total compensation
and average VP total compensation in the same industry and in the same
size quartile as the firm
VP pay rise after acquisi-
tion (%)
Ratio between the average VP total compensation in the year after the
acquisition and the average VP total compensation in the year of the
acquisition
VP ability VP ability index consisting of VP’s education background and profes-
sional experience sourced from BoardEx. Education background con-
tains information on whether a VP holds undergraduate, graduate, and/
or MBA degrees. Professional experience contains information on
whether a VP has legal/consulting experience, academic experience, ac-
counting/finance experience, and/or management experience. Higher
value indicates higher VP ability
(continued)












ln(Firm size) Natural logarithm of net sales (SALE)
Leverage Book value of debt (DLTTþDLC) divided by the book value of debt
plus market value of equity (DLTTþDLCþCSHO*PRCC)
Tobin’s q Market value of assets over the book value of assets (AT - CEQ þ
CSHO*PRCC)/AT)
Cash flow Operating income before depreciation (OIBDP) scaled by the book value
of total assets (AT)
Board independence Percentage of independent directors on the board (Source: Riskmetrics)
Board size Number of directors on the board (Source: Riskmetrics)
Institutional ownership Percentage of the firm owned by institutional investors, sourced from 13f
filings
Entrenchment index Entrenchment index sourced from Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009)
Firm governance Governance quality index consisting of board independence, board size
and institutional ownership. Higher value indicates better firm
governance
Stock price runup Bidder’s buy and hold abnormal return (BHAR) during the period (-210,
-11). The market index is the CRSP value-weighted return
Deal characteristics
Relative deal size Deal value (SDC: DEALVALUE) over bidder’s market value of equity
(CSHO*PRCC). Deal value is measured as the total value of consider-
ation paid by the acquirer excluding fees and expenses
Cross-industry Dummy variable that equals one if bidder and target do not share a
Fama-French 49 industry, and zero otherwise
Cross-border Dummy variable that equals one if the target nation is not the same as
acquirer nation, and zero otherwise
All-cash deal Dummy variable that equals 1 for purely cash-financed deals, and zero
otherwise
Private target Dummy variable that equals 1 for public targets, and zero otherwise
Subsidiary target Dummy variable that equals 1 for subsidiary targets, and zero otherwise
M&A wave Number of acquisitions in a Fama-French 49 industry in a given year
Other variables
Insider CEO Dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO has worked for the firm prior
to becoming the CEO, and zero otherwise
VP pay dispersion Standard deviation of VP pay
Industry concentration HHI index sourced from Hoberg and Phillips (2016)
Product similarity Total similarity index sourced from Hoberg and Phillips (2016)
Local supply of VPs Sum of total number of VPs working in firms in the same ZIP code,




Average of ln(Pay ratio) for firms in the same size quartile and the same
Fama-French 49 industry as the acquirer
ln(Size-adjusted industry
CEO delta)
Average of ln(CEO delta) for firms in the same size quartile and the
same Fama-French 49 industry as the acquirer
ln(Size-adjusted industry
CEO delta)
Average of ln(CEO vega) for firms in the same size quartile and the
same Fama-French 49 industry as the acquirer
This table describes the variables used in the paper.
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Table A2
Breakdown of number of acquisitions by each firm





































This table provides the breakdown of the number of acquisitions conducted by each firm in our sample.
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Table A3
Baseline regression results using different level of standard error clustering
(1) (2)
SE clustered by industry SE clustered by industry-year
ln(Pay ratio) 0.354** 0.354*
(2.376) (1.889)
ln(CEO delta) 0.144** 0.144*
(2.095) (2.003)
ln(CEO vega) 0.101* 0.101
(1.853) (1.505)
CEO entrenchment 0.177 0.177
(0.599) (0.588)
CEO turnover 0.476** 0.476**
(2.045) (2.313)
Number of VPs 0.069 0.069
(0.995) (0.851)






Tobin’s q 0.184** 0.184*
(2.193) (1.881)
Cash flow 1.873 1.873
(1.511) (1.122)
Firm governance 0.054 0.054
(0.244) (0.224)
Stock price runup 1.132*** 1.132***
(5.385) (6.216)






All-cash deal 0.481*** 0.481***
(3.508) (5.864)
Private target 1.318*** 1.318***
(6.428) (5.744)
Subsidiary target 1.863*** 1.863***
(8.671) (9.337)




Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
No. of observations 8,911 8,911
R2 .04 .04
This table reports the estimation results of tournament incentives on acquisition performance with
different levels of standard error clustering. Table A1 in the appendix defines all variables. t-statistics
are displayed in parentheses. *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
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Table A4
Deal risk analysis using within-industry deals only
Within industry deals only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Deal size Deal risk
Dep. ¼ CAR Q1 - Q3 Q4 Q1 - Q3 Q4
ln(Pay ratio) 0.123 2.016*** 0.471** 0.871**
(-0.634) (-4.080) (-2.164) (-2.229)
H0: b(1)¼b(2) H0: b(3)¼b(4)
(0.000) (0.354)
ln(CEO delta) 0.130 0.431* 0.128 0.389**
(1.534) (1.681) (1.269) (2.043)
ln(CEO vega) 0.101 0.177 0.115 0.226
(-1.426) (-0.874) (-1.442) (-1.491)
CEO entrenchment 0.047 0.552 0.247 0.510
(0.128) (-0.560) (-0.618) (0.650)
CEO turnover 0.311 2.071*** 0.643* 1.212*
(-0.981) (-2.742) (-1.834) (-1.883)
Number of VPs 0.073 0.164 0.092 0.118
(-0.822) (-0.815) (-0.926) (-0.622)
VP experience 0.070 0.022 0.044 0.084
(1.382) (-0.177) (0.744) (-0.830)
ln(Firm size) 0.112 0.325 0.313*** 0.065
(-1.328) (-1.470) (-3.515) (0.351)
Leverage 0.843 1.022 1.511* 0.911
(1.230) (0.681) (1.877) (0.644)
Tobin’s q 0.001 0.131 0.069 0.046
(-0.006) (-0.408) (-0.569) (0.239)
Cash flow 1.435 6.704* 2.562 1.124
(0.891) (1.783) (1.373) (0.384)
Firm governance 0.602** 0.821 0.270 0.114
(-1.993) (1.152) (-0.833) (-0.180)
Stock price runup 1.034*** 1.688*** 1.442*** 0.593
(-3.601) (-2.871) (-4.812) (-1.028)
Relative deal size 6.731*** 0.177 0.534 0.405
(2.643) (0.207) (0.793) (0.306)
Cross-border 0.221 0.895 0.233 0.100
(-0.973) (1.233) (-0.953) (-0.181)
All-cash deal 0.209 1.652*** 0.568*** 0.612
(1.126) (3.177) (2.718) (1.601)
Private target 0.726*** 3.185*** 1.422*** 1.252**
(2.766) (4.721) (4.880) (2.064)
Subsidiary target 1.132*** 3.948*** 2.041*** 2.161***
(3.986) (6.521) (6.924) (3.388)
M&A wave 0.332 3.220 0.279 2.863
(-0.307) (-1.014) (0.221) (-1.367)
Constant 0.685 2.819 0.379 0.763
(-0.316) (0.980) (-0.163) (0.454)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 3,830 1,276 3,830 1,276
R2 .04 .19 .07 .09
This table reports the effect of tournament incentives on acquisition performance conditional upon deal
risk using a sample of within-industry deals only. Deal size is measured as the relative deal size. Deal risk
is measured as the post-acquisition minus preacquisition stock return standard deviations. Table A1 in
the appendix defines all variables. t-statistics are calculated from robust standard errors clustered by firm
and are displayed in parentheses. *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
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